most scholars' expectations) been eroded by voters' attitudes toward social issues (including race), but is instead largely unrelated to these concerns.
Conceptualizing Class Politics and Political Realignment
Much of the recent research on class and politics has used multicategory class schemes and multivariate statistical models to improve upon earlier dichotomous conceptualizations and measures of classes and class voting Nieuwbeerta 1995) . However, because the focus of most of this research has been on class-based differences in vote choice per se, relatively few researchers have analyzed the causal forces generating stability or change in the relationship between class and vote choice. The few studies (e.g., Weakliem 1991 Weakliem , 1995b ) that do address causal questions of this sort tend, moreover, to assume that the same forces explain political changes among all classes, an assumption that is appropriate to evaluate as an hypothesis in the course of research. Developing a more systematic understanding of the causal mechanisms that govern change and comparative differences in the relationship between class and political behavior means that we must directly address these two limitations in the existing research literature. 2 We introduce two theoretical concepts as a means of addressing these problems. First, we use the concept of class voting to refer to divergent patterns of vote choice among classes (whatever their source). When class-based differences at the ballot box are large, class voting is high; conversely, when class-based differences are small, class voting is low. While these differences have traditionally involved workingclass citizens supporting left parties and members of the middle class supporting right parties (see Alford 1963) , the possibility of other class-based political alignments should not be ruled out (Brooks & Manza 1997a; .
Whereas class voting refers to electoral outcomes, we use the concept of class politics to refer to instances when class-related factors are the causal mechanism explaining (class-specific) differences or trends in vote choice (cf. Mair 1993). The most common class-related causal mechanism posited to explain political outcomes is material interests (see Lipset et al. 1954 ; cf. Evans 1993). Here, the claim is that political divisions are likely to arise out of the different material interests generated by voters' class locations. We also consider two other class-related mechanisms: class identification (e.g., Jackman & Jackman 1983; Vannemann & Cannon 1987; Wright 1985) and preferences for policy alternatives relating to class inequalities (e.g., Mann 1973 ). Class identification can be an important political 382 I Social Forces 76:2, force, insofar as viewing oneself as "working class" or "middle class" enables the class incumbent to identify potential allies as well as antagonists, thereby making it possible to judge which political party is more likely to advance one's class interests.3
With regard to class-related policy attitudes, the main historical alternative to laissez-faire capitalism has been the forms of social provision made available to citizens by modern welfare states. As a result, support for (as well as opposition to) redistributive policies or progressive taxation tends to have a class character, given that the latter represent interventions in the marketplace that alter the distribution of income in favor of poorer households (Esping-Andersen 1990). We expect that a key source of resistance to U.S. social welfare programs stems from the interests some classes tend to have in safeguarding their income (itself a product of the unequal distribution of assets) from redistributive public policies (Piven & Cloward 1985) .
Providing there is sufficient evidence, we may infer that one of the preceding class-related factors explains trends in class voting. However, nonclass forcese.g. other types of policy attitudes or demographic factors -can also be related to both class location and vote choice. In such cases, class differences or trends in voting may only be contingently related to political outcomes. In the absence of additional information, inferring class politics from class voting per se can thus result in serious errors of causal interpretation. In particular, if class-specific trends in vote choice are actually the product of nonclass forces, then it is misleading to construe these trends as reflecting class politics.4 As a result, observations of the voting patterns among classes provide insufficient information for answering questions about the role of class factors in generating political outcomes. Using a multivariate model, we must instead test hypotheses about the causal roles played by class-related versus nonclass mechanisms.
SECULAR REALIGNMENTS AND POLITICAL SHIFTS
In addition to our distinction between class voting and class politics, it is also necessary to specify the nature of the class-specific political changes under investigation. We use three theoretical concepts of change in voting behavior: realignments ("secular" and "critical") and electoral shifts. Realignment theory-which emphasizes the importance of decisive changes in partisan allegiances and voting behavior -has been a central tool in the analysis of political behavior since influential research by Key (1955 Key ( , 1959 . In recent years, however, the realignment concept has come under criticism as being too specific to capture other types of political change while also providing a poor description of voting patterns since the 1960s (e.g., Carmines & Stimson 1989; Ladd 1991; Shafer 1991a Given that political changes involving electorate-wide switches of allegiance and originating in the span of a single election are rare, the two preceding assumptions allow realignment theory to have greater generality. In the twentieth century, "critical" realignments involving a majority of voters are limited to Roosevelt's victories in 1932 and 1936 (as critics of realignment theory such as Ladd 1991 have noted). But group-specific realignments in which a segment of the electorate switches allegiance from one to the other major party are a good deal more common (Nexon 1980; Petrocik 1981) . Likewise, while group-specific critical realignments can occur in a single election, secular realignments that emerge over the course of several elections are much more common (Seagull 1980 ). For instance, while Carmines and Stimson's landmark (1989) study of U.S. racial politics is prefaced by a vigorous critique of the (critical) realignment concept, their own research on the partisan evolution of racial issues is consistent with the emergence of a secular, group-specific realignment of white southerners from the Democratic to the Republican Party.5
In the current study, we use the concepts of secular and critical realignments to identify class-specific patterns of political change.6 Both types of realignments are typically accompanied by a new issue or conflict with respect to which the major parties take divergent policy positions (see Sundquist 1983 ). The new conflict enables groups within the electorate to align themselves with a preferred party, often creating a new political cleavage or transforming older cleavages. In the current research, social issues relating to civil rights and gender equality are the issue at the heart of professionals' realignment with the Democratic Party, whereas ideological opposition to the welfare state is a central issue in the realignment of the self-employed with the Republican Party. Whether these issues have emerged in the course of a single election or evolve more slowly is a question that we also address in the course of our analyses. More specifically, we build from our earlier work (Brooks & Manza 1997a; , showing that professionals' realignment has been unfolding since 1964 and is thus a case of secular realignment. The self-employed, by contrast, realigned during a single (critical) election, in 1980.
Whereas a realignment involves a fundamental change in political alignment from consistent support for one party's candidates to support for the other party's, political shifts involve a simple (i.e., nonrealigning) increase or decrease in support for a given party's candidates. While not nearly as dramatic as realignments, the concept of a shift captures trends that involve changes in the magnitude of support that a group of voters give to their preferred party. In the current study, unskilled workers' recent voting trends exemplify a shift, for while they remain largely 384 / Social Forces 76:2, Democratic, their level of support has eroded considerably over the course of the past four elections with important consequences for the Democrats' class coalition.
CONTEXTUALIZING CLASS-SPECIFIC VOTING TRENDS
The preceding concepts of political change have implications for analyzing changes in the relationship between class and vote choice. Given the contrasting structure of critical versus secular realignments -as well as the contrasting magnitude of realignments versus shifts -we may reasonably expect that not all class-specific trends in vote choice can be subsumed under the same concept. Hence, we model voting changes by parameterizing class-specific trends as applying to specific historical periods and having different structures (i.e., occurring rapidly during a single election versus cumulatively over the course of multiple elections). As a result, our approach goes beyond our earlier analyses (see , which implicitly assumed that voting trends among all classes occur during the same period of time, while also having the same linear structure. The approach developed here delivers more precise information about the extent and nature of class-specific trends in vote choice. Our alternative model (discussed in detail in the statistical models section of the article) finds strong evidence for a secular realignment among professionals, a critical realignment relating to the self-employed in the 1980 election, and a voting shift among unskilled workers in recent elections.
Data and Measures

DATA
For the analyses presented in this study, we use National Election Study (NES) data from presidential election year surveys for 1952 through 1992 (Center for Political Studies 1995). The NES is the premier source of U.S. voting data, with a rich battery of political, attitudinal, and demographic items and lengthy time-series data. Our dependent variable is presidential vote choice, which is coded "1" for choice of the Democratic and "0" for the choice of the Republican candidate. In the first stage of the analyses we establish the class-specific trends in vote choice to subsequently be explained. We then use a series of regression decompositions to analyze the sources of voting trends among professionals, the self-employed, and unskilled workers. These trends are particularly noteworthy in that they exemplify the three concepts of political change discussed in the previous section of the article; all three trends have also occurred during the 1972-92 period. The two remaining class-specific trends -pertaining to managers and skilled workers -occurred prior to 1972. To keep the scope of the current study manageable, we postpone presentation of our analyses of these two trends for another context.
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CLASS CATEGORIES
Multicategory class schemata are preferable to dichotomous measures of class contrasting "blue" versus "white"-collar workers (see Weakliem 1995b ). By providing information on class-based political differences existing within each of these two groups, multicategory schemata enable researchers to avoid the serious biases that follow from analyses that estimate the political effects of class using dichotomous measures. We thus distinguish at the outset between six class categories and one residual category for those without an occupational class location. This scheme is based on information about the respondents' occupation and employment situation available in each year of the NES series. We code the data as follows:7
(1) Professionals (both salaried and self-employed, including lawyers, physicians, engineers, teachers, scientists, writers, editors, and social Once we have established the class-specific trends in vote choice to be explained, we model the causal factors responsible for voting changes among professionals, proprietors, and unskilled workers. For these analyses, we use a set of items that can be grouped into four subsets depending upon whether they relate to class, other sociodemographic forces, social issue attitudes, or political alienation (see Table 1 ). The independent variables relating to class allow us to test the hypothesis that it is class-related forces that explain (class-specific) shifts or realignments in voting behavior. If class-related factors do not account for these patterns of change, the other three sets of independent variables (discussed below) allow us to test alternative hypotheses about other causal mechanisms that have been found to be related to political change.
Given the complexity of class forces, we use a series of items to measure its separate dimensions. We use two measures of class-related material interests: objective (household income) and subjective (respondents' evaluation of their current economic situation). The first of these measures is a continuous variable scaled to constant, 1992 dollars. The second is a trichotomous item asking respondents to assess their current economic situation in comparison to the past year. We analyze this item as two dummy variables for "same as>' and "worse off than a year ago" (with the reference category being the assessment "better than a year ago"). Given that the actual degree to which people identify with a dass location tends not to reduce to purely objective factors, we also consider the role of class identification. The identification item we use is a dichotomy, coded "l" if respondents identify themselves as working dass and "0" otherwise.
Our measure of dass-related policy preferences is provided by responses to an item asking whether the federal government "should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living." As discussed earlier, endorsements of -as well as opposition to -the welfare state tend to have significant class content. Members of the working dass, so long as they vote on the basis of their interests in policies that minimize the disruptive effects of the unregulated market, should prefer to expand (or at least to maintain) egalitarian governmental policies. By contrast, people whose incomes are disproportionately high by virtue of their advantageous class location (such as managers) have an interest in keeping the largest possible share of these incomes, and hence in opposing social policies that require redistribution. The National Election Study (NES) guaranteed jobs item provides a useful measure of the degree to which people support the most prominent social policy designed to protect the interests of the working dass in the postwar United States (Weir 1992 ). In the analyses that follow, we analyze this 7-category welfare state item as a continuous variable.
Our final indictor of class-related factors is union membership. As a measure of working-class networks, union membership exposes people to working class organizations, thereby raising the likelihood that they will view their life chances as depending on the collective welfare of other workers. As shown in Table 1 , union membership is a dichotomy, coded "1" if a respondent is a member and "0" otherwise.
We analyze six variables representing other (nonclass) sociodemographic attributes: region, gender, race, public sector employment, age, and education. Given their relation to social networks that can shape political preferences, the compositional changes measured by these variables may help to explain changes in vote choice. The first four of these we analyze as a series of dummy variables, In addition to class and sociodemographic forces, we also consider factors relating to peoples' degree of alienation from electoral politics. Some earlier studies have found high levels of disenchantment with party politics among the U.S. working class (e.g., Burnham 1982; Weakliem 1995b), and such findings may help to explain declining levels of support for Democratic candidates among the skilled and unskilled workers in our analyses. We analyze responses to a dichotomous NES item as our measure of political alienation. This item asks respondents whether they are concerned with the outcome of the current elections. Lower levels of concern with a national election's outcomes are indicative of high levels of alienation from electoral politics and thus may be potentially relevant to understanding the shift in unskilled workers' voting behavior analyzed in this study. 
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The alternative model of class voting we introduce in this artide is summarized in equation 2. We derived this model by testing various substantively meaningful constraints on model 1. These constraints relate to the structure (e.g., linear or abrupt) or timing (e.g., developing over the entire series versus emerging only since 1980) of class-specific voting trends. While our preferred constraints are somewhat cumbersome to express in formal notation, their reference to specific periods and the implied structure of trends is relatively straightforward. They also result in a more parsimonious model that restricts class-specific trends to particular classes and specific elections (or blocks of elections). Comparison of the fit of models 1 versus 2 thus enables us to test hypotheses about the structure, duration, and scope of class-specific trends in vote choice during the 1952 to 1992 period.
Our alternative model hypothesizes trends relating to five of the seven classes: professionals, managers, the self-employed, skilled workers, and unskilled workers. For the self-employed and unskilled workers, E1o is coded "0" for all elections before 1980, and "1" for the 1980 through 1992 elections, constraining their voting trends to be a single-step change taking place during (and continuing after) the 1980 election. In contrast to the cumulative voting trends implied by the linear change parameters, these two "single-step" constraints result in a dramatic pattern of change that occurs during a single election. Given that there are a total of five trend parameters in the model (one for each of the five preceding classes), model 2 thus consumes one less degree of freedom than model 1.
MEASURING THE CLASS CLEAVAGE IN VOTE CHOICE
Once we have established our preferred model of class-specific voting trends, we graph our results as a means of presenting and summarizing the trends. These estimates are derived using the same normalizing strategy discussed in detail by Hout et al. (1995) and by Manza et al. (1995) , in which the logistic coefficients for the class categories sum to zero at each election for purposes of identification. Each data point thus reflects a class-specific deviation from the overall mean (of zero) for a particular election. As a result, this measure allows the researcher to determine whether a particular class supports a given party relative to the average support received by that party (among all classes).
While some identifying constraint is necessary to derive voting scores for each class, the zero-sum constraint has important substantive advantages. When a classspecific score is positively signed, it indicates a greater tendency to favor Democratic candidates (relative to the mean of zero); conversely, negative scores indicate support for Republican candidates (again relative to the mean). By examining changes over time in the voting scores for each class, we can infer whether and to what extent a given class has experienced a political trend.
Turning to explanatory questions, we analyze the causal factors that account for class-specific trends in vote choice. For these analyses, we use the model's coefficients and the relevant sample means in a regression decomposition (Firebaugh 1997; Jones and Kelley 1984; see Teixeira [ 1987] for an application to the analysis of voter turnout). These decompositions enable us to gauge the effect of each of the causal factors measured in the model to explaining class-specific trends (we discuss these in Appendix A). In this way, we can gauge the relative importance of class versus nonclass causal factors in explaining the voting trends under investigation.
Results
CLASS-SPECIFIC TRENDS IN VOTE CHOICE, 1952-1992
In Table 2 The preceding results of the trend analysis show why it is preferable to distinguish between types of political change while also parameterizing the (variable) context of voting trends among specific classes. The current results reveal much more clearly than our earlier analyses the precise historical contours of these class-specific political changes. The two most salient differences are for unskilled workers and the self-employed: The trends for these two classes (see Figure 1) follow a distinctive and very abrupt change during the 1980 election that was not discovered in the earlier analyses.
To highlight the findings delivered by our model of class voting, we also present in Figure 1 a second set of "smoothed trend" estimates that are graphed as light, dashed lines to distinguish them from the first set of estimates. The smoothed trend estimates are derived by using the data points (representing the normed coefficient for a specific class category under our preferred model) to estimate an ordinary least-squares model of trends in each of the seven panels. By virtue of being leastsquares regression lines, these estimates reveal what information is lQst by eliminating all context-specific variation. While professionals' and (to a lesser extent) routine white-collar employees' trends are comparable under both sets of estimates, the remaining four class-specific trends show significant departures from linearity over the 1952-92 series as a whole. This result demonstrates the importance of models of class-specific voting trends that take advantage of nonlinear constraints.
EXPLAINING CLASS-SPECIFIC POLITICAL CHANGES SINCE 1972
Turning to questions about the causal bases of these trends, we now analyze the factors responsible for voting trends among professionals, unskilled workers, and the self-employed. All these trends occurred during the 1972-92 period. Given that professionals' voting trend is approximately linear, we choose the 1972 and 1992 elections as the end-points of our comparison. The self-employed and unskilled workers, however, experienced a sharp right-turn during the 1980 election that has continued to affect their voting patterns. For these two classes we thus treat the entire 1980 through 1992 elections as the period with which to compare to the 1972 election.
We present the results of our explanatory analyses in Table 3 (a table with 
the coefficients of the preferred model is available from the authors). The estimates in the table's columns represent the predicted effect (in logits) that change in a row-
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specific factor has on vote choice for a particular class between the elections in question. The last row's estimates aire the sum of the row-specific effects on vote choice for each factor. By dividing each estimate by its appropriate column total, we thus arrive at a summary measure of the relative causal importance of a given factor (presented in parentheses). Using gender among professionals as our example, the .01 estimate indicates that the increasing proportion of women in the professions has raised the log-odds of professionals favoring the Democratic candidate by .01. The .02 figure in parentheses (calculated by dividing .01 by the total predicted logit change, .48) summarizes the contribution of this change to explaining professionals' overall shift during the 1972 to 1992 period. The 2% figure tells us that the changing gender distribution of professions has had a very small impact on change in their voting behavior. Table 3 's estimates show that the key to professionals' realignment is their increasingly liberal views of social issues relating to race and gender. The .49 estimate for the combined effect of change in professionals' attitudes towards social issues represents 102% of the total predicted change in vote choice. The latter proportion exceeds 100% because had only these attitudinal changes occurred, professionals' shift would in fact have been somewhat larger. As it was, however, the negative effects of sociodemographic changes (see Table 1 ) pushed professionals' in the direction of support for Republican candidates, slightly muting the Democratic effects of changing attitudes toward social issues. Both class-related and political alienation factors, it should be noted, have a positive, but minimal (2% and 4% respectively) bearing on explaining professionals' changing voting behavior.
Like professionals, the self-employed have become more liberal in their views of social issues (see Table 1 & Manza 1997a) . The self-employed have also moved from a point near this equivocal threshold to much deeper levels of GOP support, and they have done so in a fashion that conforms to the critical realignment concept. Unlike professionals, however, political realignment among the self-employed is largely a product of class forces relating to changing economic experiences under Democratic versus Republican administrations and a growing ideological opposition to the welfare state. The conjunction of economic calculations and conservative policy-related attitudes thus suggest the emergence of a conservative (and comprehensive) form of class politics among the selfemployed.
Unskilled workers have not experienced any -much less a specifically Republican -realignment. While their class-specific voting patterns in the past four elections reflect a decline in traditionally high levels of support for Democratic candidates, they remain the most Democratic of the seven categories in the analyses. Voting trends among unskilled workers are not, moreover, the product of greater feelings of political alienation, for since 1980 workers actually report caring more about the outcome of presidential elections than previously. Instead, this political shift among unskilled workers is the outgrowth of higher levels of economic satisfaction under Republican administrations (and particularly high levels of dissatisfaction in 1980 under a Democratic President) coupled with declining support for the welfare state. This form of conservative class politics is very similar to the forces realigning the self-employed. Moreover, its presence among the working class cuts against an expectation common among class analysts and political commentators alike, that the growing immiseration of the working class in postindustrial societies will by itself eventually compel them to support liberal or left political alternatives.
Taken as a whole, we thus find that class-related factors are central to explaining many of the class-specific trends in vote choice. In fact, without grasping the critical roles played by these class factors, we cannot properly understand the sources of two of the three trends analyzed in this article.2' The results of the current study thus find no support for the comprehensive decline in the salience of U.S. class politics that some analysts have hypothesized ( We can readily extend the current analyses to answer this question. The key theoretical concept is the total class deavage, which we measure as the standard deviation of the coefficients for each dass at a given election.23 Since we want to know what effect changing attitudes toward social issues has had on the class deavage once social issue attitudes have been taken into account, we must rely on the 1972-92 NES data. Limiting the analyses to this period is a function of the relevant NES items being unavailable before 1972. This limitation should not, however, influence our analyses of the effect of social issues, since it is after 1972 that many of the dass-specific trends occur. As an additional check on the choice of the six most recent elections, we also present below our estimates of change in the total class deavage (not controlling for social issues) for the entire 1952-92 period. These twin sets of estimates allow us to evaluate whether the estimate of the total dass deavage obtained using only the data from the 1972-92 election studies leads to a biased portrait of the 1972-92 period (compared to the portrait derived from our analyses of the entire 1952-92 dataset).
We present in Figure 2 Taken in sum, these analyses reveal that differences in voting behavior based on class location versus attitudes towards social issues represent distinct and largely unrelated cleavages. To be sure, change in the social issue deavage has had a slight effect on the class cleavage since 1972, but only by flattening out what would have otherwise been a slight, net increase in the dass deavage during this period. This latter effect is due to the slightly greater political salience social issues have among professionals (i.e., there is an interaction effect between social-issue attitudes and being a professional on vote choice). However, with the exception of professionals, social issues affect all dasses in the same way. By virtue of this relationship, controlling for the social issue deavage does not decrease the magnitude of the dass cleavage. The rising importance of social issues and the growth of socially liberal attitudes are, as we have shown, important and politcally relevant phenomena in their own right. However, these processes have little relationship to dass politics and cannot be used to explain either the magnitude or the stability of the dass cleavage as a whole. Contrary to theories that assume dass politics and social issue politics exist in a zero-sum relationship to one another, we find them to have little relationship to one another (and thus to be positive-sum). The final message of this study is that while dass politics increasingly competes with other salient bases of electoral alignments, the class cleavage in presidential vote choice exhibits a robustness that appears likely to persist into the future. In the preceding equation, we use the 72 subscript to indicate that the equation applies to the 1972 election. Note that by giving each term an additional subscript relating to class (e.g., k = 1 for professionals, 2 for managers, . . . ,7 for nonlabor force), we can rewrite 4a to refer to the specific class whose changing voting behavior is being analyzed. In the current example, we assume that equations 4a-c refer to professionals only, but we do not insert the second subscripts to avoid cumbersome notation. In equation 4b 11. In addition to the statistical power gained by not discarding a sizable portion of the data, including the non-full labor force participants is also necessary to conduct comparisons between the class cleavage and other politically relevant cleavages (see Brooks & Manza 1997b ).
Class Politics and Political
12. With regard to the inter-relationships between the independent variables, we note that the correlations between these variables are generally modest, with the largest among the class and sociodemographic variables being for household income and years of education (r= .39). Even responses to the two social issue items are only slightly correlated (r= .19), and collinearity is thus not a concern in the regression analyses.
13
. We do not accordingly analyze third party presidential candidates in these analyses, treating the choice of these candidates as irrelevant to understanding the class bases of major party vote choice (see Hout et al. 1995 16. This hypothesis emerges from our earlier research that found professionals' voting trends to be linked to their changing attitudes towards social issues (see Brooks & Manza 1997a ).
17. This constraint is consistent with our concept of a "critical realignment,' but we must gauge the actual magnitude of change in the vote choice of these two classes to determine whether they do, in fact, qualify as realignments.
18. While the voting patterns of routine white-collar workers have moved them towards the Democratic Party (relative to the mean), we believe it is appropriate to postpone interpreting their shift as a realignment until evidence from additional elections can be gathered, given that our model does not include a trend parameter pertaining specifically to this class.
19. To conserve space, we do not present the additional figure graphing the trend estimates for non-full-time labor force participants (this figure is available upon request). These results are, however, easily summarized: The voting behavior of non-full-time labor force participants has generally been more Republican than Democratic, but shows considerable election-to-election volatility with no net shift in alignment.
20. We note that evidence that unskilled workers are becoming less Democratic since 1976 flies in the face of much conventional wisdom about the consequences of postindustrial economic change. Unskilled workers saw their average household incomes erode by approximately 5% during this period in the NES data, yet nonetheless report higher levels of economic satisfaction. Taken in tandem with our findings about unskilled workers' declining support for the welfare state, this result suggests that unskilled workers have become less resistant to an important ideological legacy of the two Reagan administrations, which spread an optimistic message of economic prosperity while urging a view of economic well-being as linked to tax cuts and a reduction in government social services.
21
. These results also demonstrate the importance of conceptualizing and measuring the multiple dimensions of class politics. Insofar as there are multiple class-related forces that can affect political behavior (e.g. material interests, identification, or economic policy attitudes), it is appropriate for research not to reduce them to a single causal factor.
22
. We discuss additional details of professionals' realignment (including the role of partisanship) at greater length in Brooks and Manza (1997a 
